














There! is! a! growing! literature! that! studies! the! management! of! common! pool! resources!
(CPRs)!within!the!context!of!controlled!laboratory!experiments.!!The!seminal!work!in!this!
area!is!presented!in!Ostrom!et!al.!(1994)!although!some!of!this!work!appeared!earlier.! !A!
major! thesis! of! this! work! is! that! nonSbinding! communication! (cheap! talk)! among!
appropriators!of!the!commons!may!be!sufficient!to!permit!them!to!manage!the!commons!
efficiently!without!requiring!an!outside!regulator.!!
! Numerous! extensions! to! the! work! by! Gardner,! Ostrom! and! Walker! have! been!
completed! since! these! seminal! studies.! ! Among! them! is! the! environment! introduced! in!
Schott! et! al.! (2007)! and! extended! in! Buckley! et! al.! (2009,! 2013)! which! use! a! CPR!


































nonSbinding! communication! (cheap! talk)! is! a! powerful! tool! for!managing! the! commons.!





controlled! laboratory! environments! with! and! without! nonSbinding! communication! by!
including!the!role!of!costly!and!costless!monitoring!and!sanctioning,!direct!regulation!and!
voting!on!management!rules.! !This!work! includes!environments!with!neutral! frames!that!
use! subjects! recruited! from!university! campuses,! environments! framed! as! common!pool!
resources! with! subjects! recruited! from! communities! of! people! who! earn! their! livings!
appropriating!resources!from!common!pools!and!some!environments!which!compare!the!
outcomes! from! the! different! kinds! of! subjects! (see!Hackett! et! al.! (1994),! Cardenas! et! al.!
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(2000),! Schmitt! et! al.! (2000),! Walker! et! al.! (2000),! Cardenas! et! al.! (2004),! Castillo! and!
Saysel! (2005),! Moir! (2008),! Ahn! et! al.! (2010),! Janssen! (2010),! Janssen! et! al.! (2010),!
MorenoSSánchez!and!Maldonado!(2010),!Velez!et!al.!(2010),!Cardenas!(2011),!Velez!et!al.!
(2012),!Janssen!(2013)!and!Janssen!et!al.!(2013)).!
Another! extension! of! this!work! is! found! in! Schott! et! al.! (2007)! and!Buckley! et! al.!
(2009,! 2013)! which! uses! a! similar! CPR! environment! to! study! outputSsharing! among!
appropriators!from!the!commons!as!a!management!tool!as!well!as!the!way!in!which!private!
communication! (withinSgroup)! and!public! communication! (among!all! appropriators)! can!
affect! the! efficiency! of! system! appropriation! and! the! effectiveness! of! nonSbinding!
communication.!
The! current! paper! focuses! on! the! effect! of! nonSbinding! communication! on!
appropriation! from! a! CPR.! ! The! results! from! the! two! environments! first! presented! in!
Ostrom!et!al.! (1992)!provide!contrasting!results.! !The!environments!have! the!same!yield!
function!for!the!CPR!and!the!same!number!of!appropriators!(8).!!The!environments!differ!
according!to!the!endowment!of!effort!available!to!allocate!between!appropriation!from!the!
CPR!and! to!an!alternative!activity! that!pays!a! fixed! return!per!unit!of! effort! applied! (the!
different! perSsubject! endowments! are! 10! and! 25! units).! ! Both! environments! tend! to!
converge!to!the!Nash!equilibrium!predicted!for!the!oneSshot!allocation!game,!although!the!
convergence!is!faster!for!the!environment!with!the!smaller!perSsubject!endowment.!!When!
nonSbinding! communication! is! permitted! prior! to! each! round! in!which! an! appropriation!
decision! must! be! made,! the! environment! with! the! smaller! system! endowment! of! effort!
converges!quickly!to!the!optimal!outcome.!!The!environment!with!the!larger!endowments!
shows! an! increase! in! net! system! rent,! but! not! nearly! as! great! as! displayed! in! the!
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environment!with! the! smaller! system!net! rent! (about!60!percent!of! the!optimal!net! rent!
versus! nearly! 100! percent! of! the! optimal! net! rent).! ! The! environment! with! the! smaller!
system!endowment!tends!to!be!the!environment!used!in!most!of!the!extensions!following!
Ostrom!et!al.!(1992)!and!Ostrom!et!al.!(1994).!





to! the! Nash! equilibrium! for! the! oneSshot! game,! as! does! the! system! effort! for! the! nonS
binding!communication!environment.!!In!many!ways!the!Buckley!et!al.!(2013)!environment!
is!similar!to!the!Ostrom!et!al.!(1992)!small!endowment!environment.!!The!outcomes!for!the!
noScommunication! treatments! are! comparable,! yet! the! outcomes! after! 15! rounds! of!
decisions! in! the! communication! treatments! diverge.! ! The! Buckley! et! al.! (2013)!
communication! results! are,! however,! close! to! the! results! from! the! Ostrom! et! al.! (1992)!
large!endowment!environment.!
We!are! selecting! the! two!Ostrom!et! al.! (1992)!environments! to! compare!with! the!
Buckley!et!al.! (2013)!environment!because!of! the!availability!of!comparable!data!and!the!
number! of! rounds! of! decisionSmaking! included! in! the! laboratory! sessions! as!well! as! the!
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fewer%units%of% effort% to% allocate% to% appropriation% than% in% the% three% chosen%environments.%%
Furthermore,%some%are%dynamic%and%allow%the%stock%of% resources% in% the%common%pool% to%
vary%over%the%course%of%the%session%as%harvest%activity%changes.%
The%Ostrom%et%al.%(1992)%results%and%the%Buckley%et%al.%(2013)%results,%as%presented,%
are%not%directly%comparable.% %The% latter%uses%system%effort%as% the%variable%of% interest%and%
the% former% use% relative% net% system% rents% as% the% variable% of% interest.% % Our% objective% is% to%
generate% both% the% relative% system% effort% and% relative% net% system% rent% data% for% the% three%
environments%so%that%we%can%compare%the%Ostrom%et%al.%(1992)%and%Buckley%et%al.%(2013)%





The% figures%reflect%differences% in%yield% functions%(technical%parameters%of% the%CPR),%effort%
available% for% appropriation% by% people% removing% resources% from% the% CPR% and% the%
opportunity% cost% of% effort% devoted% to% appropriation% from% the% CPR.% The% figures% are%
constructed%to%reflect%the%mean%value%of%the%yield%from%the%CPR,%the%mean%value%of%the%net%
rent% from% appropriation% from% the% CPR% and% the%mean% value% of% the% profit% received% by% an%
appropriator% from% the% CPR% per% period% as% a% function% of% total% system% effort% devoted% to%
appropriation.% These% figures% provide% an% abstracted% picture% of% the% incentives% that% are%
created% by% the% different% environments.% The% figures% are% presented% in% two% formats.% In% the%
first,% the% vertical% axes% are% denominated% in% the% local% currency% in%which% participants%were%
% 8%
paid.% % For% two%environments% this% is% in%1990%US%dollars.% % In% the% third%environment% this% is%
2009%Canadian%dollars.%%The%second%format%presents%the%same%schedules%with%their%vertical%
axes%denominated% in%1990%US%dollars.% % This% conversion% is% done% to%make% the%harvest,% net%







Y%=%23%E%–%0.25%E2% % % % % % (1)%
where%Y% is% total%yield%and%E% is% system%effort%devoted% to%appropriation% from%the%CPR.%Y% is%
measured%in%laboratory%dollars%(L$).%%
The% yield% function% for% the% environment% introduced% in% Schott% et% al.% (2007)% that% we% will%
identify%as%the%S28%environment%is%%
Y%=%32.5%E%–%0.09375%E2% % % % % (2)%
where%Y%and%E%are%defined%as%above.%%%
For% O10% and% O25,% each% appropriator% can% apply% up% to% 10% and% 25% units% of% effort,%
respectively,% to% appropriation% from% the% CPR.% % The% opportunity% cost% of% applying% effort% to%
appropriation% is%L$5.% %There%are%8%appropriators% in% the%O10%and%O25%environments.% %For%
S28,%each%appropriator% can%apply%up% to%28%units%of%effort% to%appropriation% from% the%CPR.%%




for% the% laboratory% currency.% %We%are%using%L$% to% “normalize”% the%name%of% the% laboratory%
currency.%%%When%subjects%were%paid%for%their%participation,%their%lab%dollar%earnings%were%
converted% into%their%respective%currencies.% %For% the%O10%sessions,%L$100%=%US$1.% %For% the%
larger%O25% sessions,% L$200%=%US$1.% %The%S28% sessions% converted% lab%dollar% earnings% into%
Canadian%dollars%at%L$200%=C$1.%
Figure% 1,% Panel% A% presents% the% mean% perIperson% perIperiod% value% of% the% system%









































































































































































































































































































































































































































A" Nash" equilibrium" exists" in" these" environments" at" which" the" individual"
appropriators"over8appropriate"from"the"CPR"relative"to"the"profit"or"net8rent"maximizing"
benchmark.""For"the"O10"and"O25"environments"the"Nash"equilibrium"has"a"system"effort"
devoted" to" appropriation" of" 64" units" (80%" and" 32%" respectively" of" the" total" available"
effort)." "The"Nash"equilibrium"for" the"S28" is"288"units"of"effort"devoted" to"appropriation"
from"the"common"pool"(86%"of"the"available"effort).""
A" Stackelberg8coalition" equilibrium" exists" in" these" environment" in" which"
appropriation"from"the"CPR"is"less"than"at"the"Nash"equilibrium"but"is"still"greater"than"at"
the" optimal" level" of" appropriation" (see" Schott" and" Wing" (2010)" for" a" discussion" of"
Stackelberg8coalition" equilibria)." For" the" O10" environment," the" Stackelberg8coalition"
equilibrium"will"have"6"appropriators"in"a"coalition"allocating"total"effort"of"24"units.""The"
other" two" appropriators" will" best8respond" and" each" allocate" all" of" their" 108unit"
endowments" (system" effort" is" 44" units)." " For" the" O25" environment," the" Stackelberg8
coalition" equilibrium"has"5" appropriators" allocating" together"35"units" of" effort"while" the"
other"two"appropriators"will"each"allocate"9"units"to"appropriating"from"the"CPR"(system"
effort" is"62"units)." "The"appropriators" for"the"S28"environment"can"realize"a"Stackelberg8
coalition"equilibrium"if"8"appropriators"form"a"coalition"and"together"allocate"104"units"of"
effort" to" appropriation." " Each" of" the" remaining" 4" appropriators" will" allocate" all" of" their"
effort" endowment" (28" units)" to" appropriation" from" the" CPR." " System" effort" will" be" 216"
units.""
Appropriators" in" environment" O10" will" realize" 95%" of" the" optimal" net" rent" if" a"
coalition"equilibrium"can"be"formed"while"48%"of"the"optimal"net"rent"will"be"realized"in"
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communication." " In" the" repeated" communication" treatments," non8binding" face8to8face"
communication"occurs"prior"to"each"decision"round"for"which"participants"make"a"decision"
to"devote"effort"to"appropriation"from"the"CPR."
The" no8communication" O10" sessions" are" conducted" for" more" than" 25" rounds.""
However," Ostrom" et" al." (1992)" and" Ostrom" et" al." (1994)" do" not" discuss" results" beyond"
Table"2.""Per"Period"System"Effort,"Net"Rent"and"Profit"Benchmarks"by"Environment"
in"Lab"Dollars"and"Coalition"and"Nash"Values"Relative"to"the"Optimum"
" O10" O25" S28"





Optimum" 36" 324" 724" 36" 324" 1324" 156" 2281.5" 3373.5"
" " " " " " " " " "
Coalition" 44" 308" 708" 62" 155" 1155" 216" 1944" 3036"
Coalition/Opt+ 1.22+ 0.95+ 0.98+ 1.72+ 0.48+ 0.79+ 1.38+ 0.85+ 0.90+
" " " " " " " " " "
Nash" 64" 128" 528" 64" 128" 1128" 288" 648" 1740"





those" obtained" over" the" first" 20" rounds." " The" no8communication" O25" sessions" are"
conducted"for"20"rounds." "The"O10"and"O25"sessions"with"communication"are"conducted"
for"25"rounds,"with" the" first"10"rounds"being"conducted"without"communication"and" the"
final"15"rounds"conducted"with"repeated"communication.""Ostrom"et"al."(1992)"report"that"
there"are"3"sessions"for"each"of"the"no"communication"treatments"but"they"do"not"report"
the"period8by8period"or" session"data." " These"data" are" reported" in"Ostrom"et" al." (1994"p."
128).1""The"five8period"interval"data"and"session"data"for"4"sessions"for"the"O10"repeated"
communication"treatments"and"6"sessions"for"the"O25"repeated"communication"treatments"
are"reported" in"Ostrom"et"al." (1994,"pp.1548155).2"" "The"mean"values" for"system"net"rent"
are" presented" for" each" communication" session" in" five8period" intervals" and" the" system"
values"for"effort"in"each"round"of"each"no8communication"session"is"presented"in"Ostrom"et"
al."(1994).""
The" S28" environments" are" conducted" without" communication" and"with" repeated"
communication." " In" the" repeated" communication" treatments"non8binding" communication"
via" a" chat" window" on" the" participants’" computer" screens" occurs" prior" to" each" decision"
round" for"which"participants"make"a"decision" to"devote" effort" to" appropriation" from" the"
CPR." " The" non8communication" S28" sessions" are" conducted" for" 15" rounds." " The"
communication" S28" sessions" are" conducted" for"15." " There" are"4" sessions" for" each"of" the"











The" results"of" the"O10,"O25"and"S28"sessions"are" summarized" in"Table"3"by" the"average"
relative" net" rents" in" five8decision8round" intervals." " Relative" net" rent" is" equal" to" net" rent"













































































The" relative" system" effort" is" equal" to"mean" system" effort" for" five8round" intervals"
divided"by"the"optimal"effort"(associated"with"effort"when"system"net"rent"or"system"profit"
is"maximized)." "Table"4"summarizes"the"O10,"025"and"S28"results"with"respect"to"relative"






































































The"results"of" the"Ostrom"et"al." (1994)"CPR"environments" identified"as"O10"and"O25"and"
the"Buckley"et"al."(2013)"environment"identified"as"S28"are"compared"with"respect"to"the"
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relative" system" effort" and" relative" system" net" rent." In" particular," the" impact" of"
communication"on"the"management"of"the"CPR"is"the"focus"of"the"analysis."
Because"of" the"different" yield" function"parameters," the"different" endowments" and"
the" different" number" of" appropriators" in" the" three" environments"whose" data" have" been"
presented" above," it" is" not" possible" to" compare" the" effects" of" communication" without"
normalizing" the" results." Using" the" relative" net" system" rents" and" relative" system" effort"
permits"a"comparison"of"the"different"environments.""
Figures" 4" and" 5" present" a" comparison" of" the" baseline" (no" communication)" and"
communication" environments" for" relative" net" system" rent" and" relative" system" effort"
respectively." " Each" panel" of" each" figure" presents" the" mean" results" for" the" no"
communication"and"communication"sessions"for"each"of"the"three"environments"(O10,"O25"
and" S28)." " The" results" are" presented" for" five8period" averages." " The" benchmarks" for" the"
relative"Optimum"outcome"(always"unity),"the"relative"Coalition"outcomes"and"the"relative"
Nash"outcomes"are"also"presented"on"each"panel." "The"relative"benchmark"values" for" the"
Coalition" equilibria" (Coalition/Opt)" and" the"Nash" equilibria" (Nash/Opt)" are" presented" in"
Table"2."
The" controlled" laboratory" environments" provide" sufficiently" convincing" evidence"
that"the"O10,"O25"and"S28"environments"in"the"absence"of"communication"converge"to"the"




system" rent" quickly" falling" from"above" the"Nash"benchmark"prediction" to" values" around"
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the" predicted" value" for" both" O10" and" S28." " Adjustment" towards" the"Nash" benchmark" is"
different"for"O25"with"values"well"below"the"Nash"benchmark"(indicating"that"there"was"a"
substantial" amount"of"over8appropriation"over" the" first" fifteen"decision" rounds." "Relative"





small"endowments"of"effort" to"allocate" to"appropriation"and"whether" the"Nash"equilibria"
are"close"to"are" far" from"the"endowment," these"appropriators"will"over8appropriate" from"
the" common" pool." " The" Nash" equilibrium" is" a" remarkable" organizing" principle" for" the"
environments" without" communication." " This" is" an" environment" in" need" of" some" sort" of"
management"to"control"appropriation."
The" data" in" Tables" 3" and" 4" for" the" communication" treatments" are" presented" in"
Figures"4"and"5.""Tables"5"and"6"present"t8statistics"for"the"hypothesis"tests"that"there"is"no"
difference"between" the" relative" system"effort" or" relative" system"net" rent" in" the"O10" and"
O25" environments" with" communication," the" O10" and" S28" environments" with"
communication"and"the"O25"and"S28"environments"with"communication." "The"alternative"
hypotheses" are" that" the" pairs" of" treatments" are" different" (a" two8sided" test)." " The" tests"
indicate"that"over"the"three"five8round"intervals"of"the"communication"treatments"there"are"
differences"between"the"O10"and"O25"environments"and"the"O10"and"S28"environments"(p"







" O10"versus"S28" O10"versus"O25" O25"versus"S28"
Periods" t8stat" p8value" t8stat" p8value" t8stat" p8value"
11815" 4.692" 0.003" 4.655" 0.002" 0.407" 0.698"
16820" 8.403" 0.000" 5.620" 0.000" 3.427" 0.014"








" O10"versus"S" O10"versus"O25" O25"versus"S"
Periods" t8stat" p8value" t8stat" p8value" t8stat" p8value"
11815" 3.801" 0.009" 3.607" 0.007" 0.514" 0.626"
16820" 5.936" 0.001" 4.688" 0.002" 3.683" 0.010"
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However,( for( the( O25( and( S28( environments( there( are( no( significant( differences(
during( the( first( five:round( interval( and( the( third( five:round( interval( (p( ≥( 0.232( in( both(
intervals(for(both(relative(system(effort(and(relative(net(system(rent).((While(for(these(two(
environments( there( are( no( significant( differences( initially,( during( the( second( five:round(
interval(effort( falls(slightly( in(the(O25(environment(but(rises( in(the(S28(environment(and(
their( differences( are( significant( (p( ≤( 0.014( for( both( relative( system( effort( and( relative(
system( net( rent).( ( However,( effort( rises( in( both( environments( in( the( third( five:round(
interval( and( the( relative( system( effort( and( relative( system(net( rents( are( not( statistically(
significantly(different(over(these(last(five(rounds.(
If( we( focus( on( environments( without( communication,( O10( and( S28( display(
comparable( convergence( patterns( to( the( Nash( benchmark.( ( O25( converges( towards( the(
Nash(benchmark( from(a(different(direction(and(more(slowly( than(do(O10(and(S28.( (With(




is( limited( over:appropriation( in(O10.( ( Both( relative( system(net( rent( and( relative( system(




( Panels( B( and( C( in( Figure( 5( display( relative( system( effort( for( O25( and( S28.( ( The(
results(of(hypothesis(tests(with(regard(to(the(Coalition(and(Nash(benchmarks(for(O25(and(
( 24(
S28( over( the( last( five:round( interval( are( presented( in( Table( 7.( ( These( indicate( that( the(
relative( system( effort( for( O25( is( not( significantly( different( from( either( benchmark( (p( >(
0.132( for( both).( ( This( is( not( surprising( given( that( the( Nash( benchmark( is( 1.78( and( the(
Coalition(benchmark(is(1.72(and(the(relative(system(effort(is(about(1.50(across(the(fifteen(
decision(rounds.((For(S28,(relative(system(effort(is(significantly(different(from(the(Coalition(
benchmark( (p( =( 0.018),( but( is( not( significantly( different( from( the(Nash( benchmark( (p( =(
0.306).( ( This( too( is( not( surprising( given( that( the( Nash( benchmark( is( 1.85,( the( Coalition(






Benchmark( Net(Rent( Effort( Net(Rent( Effort(
( t:stat( p:value( t:stat( p:value( t:stat( p:value( t:stat( p:value(
Coalition( 0.833( 0.443( 1.342( 0.237( 4.792( 0.017( 4.769( 0.018(




The( motivation( to( compare( the( O10( and( O25( environments( presented( in( Ostrom( et( al.(
(1994)( and( the( S28( environment( presented( in( Buckley( et( al.( (2013)( was( the( apparent(
dramatic( difference( between( the( performances( of( the( different( environments( with(
communication.( ( In( particular,( the( S28( environment( with( 12( participants( showed( little(






Was( this( difference( attributed( to( twelve( subjects( rather( than( eight?( ( Was( there(
something(crucial(about(the(number(of(individuals(appropriating(from(a(CPR(that(resulted(
in(substantial(congestion(externalities(that(could(not(be(overcome(with(a(small(increase(in(
the( number( of( appropriators?( ( Was( this( difference( attributable( to( the( form( of(
communication:( computer:mediated( chat( room( communication( rather( than( face:to:face(
communication?((Perhaps(it(can(be(attributed(to(the(use(of(different(variables(to(measure(
the( success(of( communication(as(a(management( tool?( (The( comparisons(of( the(O10,(O25(
and(S28(environments(have(now(been(made(using(both(system(effort(and(system(net(rent.(
The( first( conclusion( from( the( new( analysis( is( that( there( are( not( significant(
differences(between( the(performance(of( subjects( in(O25(and(S28(with(respect( to(relative(
system(effort(and(relative(system(net(rent.((The(two(environments(perform(equally(poorly(
with(respect(to(the(role(communication(plays(in(reducing(appropriation(from(the(CPR.(
In( explaining( the( relatively( poor( performance( of( the(O25( environment( relative( to(





trawlers)( and( in( forestry( (individuals(with( chain( saws(versus(bulldozers).”( (This( fragility(
may( be( more( related( to( the( relationship( between( the( amount( of( resources( that( a(
( 26(
participant(can(devote( to(CPR(appropriation(relative( to( the(Optimum,(Coalition(and(Nash(




( O10( O25( S28(
Nash(Benchmark( 64( 64( 288(
Coalition(Benchmark( 44( 62( 216(
Optimum(Benchmark( 36( 36( 156(
Endowments( 80( 200( 336(
Nash/Endowment( 0.800( 0.320( 0.857(
Coalition/Endowment( 0.550( 0.310( 0.643(
Optimum/Endowment( 0.450( 0.180( 0.464(
(
Table( 8( presents( effort( benchmarks( relative( to( the( endowments( for( each(
environment.( ( (The(fragility(of(O25(relative(to(O10(is(clearly(evident(when(comparing(the(
effort( benchmarks( relative( to( endowments.( ( At( the( Optimum( state( for( O10,( 55%( of( the(
system( endowment( should( be( allocated( to( the( “alternative”( activity( but( for( O25( this(
increases(to(82%.((With(such(large(amounts(of(effort(not(needed(to(support(the(Optimum(
state(allocations(in(the(O25(environment(relative(to(the(O10(environment(it(is(not(difficult(
to( understand( the( incentives( that( may( exist( to( drive( subjects( away( from( the( optimum(
benchmark(when(coordination(has(to(be(done(through(non:binding(communication.( (This(
is(a(situation(that(could(characterize(a(CPR(fishery(regardless(of(whether(the(appropriators(
are( operating( trawlers( or( small( boats.( ( (Within( the( context( of( a( dynamic( externality( it( is(
possible( that( the( CPR( will( be( destroyed( before( the( appropriate( incentives( direct( the(
appropriators(to(allocate(their(effort(efficiently.(
( 27(














effort( and( ask( them( to( select( from( the( set( of( effort( {0,( 1,( 2,( 3,( …( ,( 9).( ( This(makes( their(
decision( space( comparable( to( the( decision( space( that( the( O10( appropriators( with(
endowments( of( 10( face.( ( Will( the( modified( O10( environment( converge( to( the( Nash(
benchmark(as(does(the(unmodified(S28?((Will(the(modified(S28(converge(to(the(optimum(
benchmark( as( does( the( unmodified( O10?( ( These( are( relatively( easy( environments( to(
implement( in( the( laboratory( and( should( provide( insight( into( the( value( of( results( from(
laboratory( environments( that( provide( participants( very( small( decision( spaces( when(
decisions(in(the(field(may(be(from(a(substantially(different(domain.(((
( 28(
There( are( many( different( ways( to( present( a( CPR( environment.( ( In( some,(
communication( works( extremely( well.( ( In( other( environments( communication( does( not(
work( as( well( in( offsetting( the( over:appropriation( found( in( environments( in( which(
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